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“SUPER LIEN” DOESN’T MEAN SUPER RISK: MONEY 
MARKET INTERMEDIATION, SECURITY INTERESTS, 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK LIEN PROTECTIONS AND 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
JONATHAN A. SCOTT* 
REGINALD T. O’SHIELDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several recent articles from staff at the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System1 and the Office of Financial Research2 highlight 
the linkage between the Federal Home Loan Bank (“FHLBank”) System 
providing collateralized loans to its member banks and the FHLBank Sys-
tem’s role in money market intermediation after the implementation of 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) money market reforms and 
Basel liquidity rules in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  One 
commentator has called the FHLBank System the “beating heart of the 
funding network that underpins the U.S. financial system.”3  The FHL-
Banks have become increasingly important providers of debt securities to 
money market funds that invest primarily in government and affiliated 
securities, including the FHLBanks.4  The FHLBanks are also important 
providers of secured advances to their members, including large members 
 
*Jonathan A. Scott is a Professor of Finance at Temple University and currently serves as 
Chairman of the Board of the Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan Banks.  Reginald 
T. O’Shields is Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
of Atlanta.  Any opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and contributor, and 
do not express the opinions or viewpoints of the FHLBanks, the FHLBank Office of Finance, 
their officers or directors, or the FHLBank System. 
 1. See S. Gissler & B. Narajabad, The Increased Role of the Federal Home Loan Bank 




 2. K. Anadu & V. Baklanova, The Intersection of U.S. Money Market Mutual Fund Re-
forms, Bank Liquidity Requirements, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System  (Office of 
Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 17-05, Oct. 31, 2017). 
 3. Louie Woodall, Soaring Fed Home Loan Bank Borrowings Spark Systemic Risk 
Fears, RISK MAGAZINE 1, 2 (Jan. 10, 2018). 
 4. Id.  
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that have become subject to more stringent liquidity requirements after 
the financial crisis.5  Finally, the FHLBanks are increasingly important 
participants in the federal funds market.6  
This growth in lending to and by the FHLBanks during the phase-
in of money market reform has been attributed in part to the FHLBanks’ 
statutory lien on collateral pledged to them by their borrowers, which 
some have referred to as a “super lien” due to its unique statutory protec-
tions.  The real estate collateral pledged to the FHLBanks has been pro-
vided by “subsidiaries of large insurance and bank holding companies to 
small savings banks and credit unions that might not otherwise have 
ready access to funding from investors who cannot secure such protec-
tion.”7 
The FHLBanks’ statutory lien was originally established by the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (“CEBA”),8 and is thus often 
referred to as the “CEBA lien.”  Its goal was to improve the standing of 
the FHLBanks as secured creditors by giving them priority in receiver-
ship over lien creditors such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (“FDIC”) acting as receiver or conservator.  This in turn would allow 
the FHLBanks to lend more securely and ensure an adequate flow of li-
quidity to the member banks and, through those banks, to businesses, 
homeowners, and other consumers.  Past reference in the literature to the 
lien argued that it created disincentives for underwriting and pricing 
risk.9  While not specifically stated in the most recent references to the 
statutory lien, the implication is that without the lien protections afforded 
to the FHLBanks, the increased money market intermediation by the 
FHLBanks would not have occurred. 
 
 5. Id.  
 6. Ben Craig & Sara Millington, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND, THE FEDERAL FUNDS 
MARKET SINCE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2017), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-
events/publications/economic-commentary/2017-economic-commentaries/ec-201707-the-
federal-funds-market-since-the-financial-crisis.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (discussing the 
federal funds market as the overnight lending market among banks in central bank reserves). 
 7. FEDS NOTES, supra note 1. 
 8. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86 (1987), 12 U.S.C. § 
226 (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., R.N. Collender & J.A. Frizell, Small Commercial Banks and the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System, 25 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 279, 280 (2002) (stating that, due to 
the existence of this special lien priority, FDIC officials remain concerned that it can enable 
or encourage risk taking by FHLBank members); see, e.g., R.L. Bennett, M.D. Vaughn & T. 
J. Yeager, Should the FDIC Worry about the FHLB? The Impact of Federal Home Loan Bank 
Advances on the Banks Insurance Fund 12 (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working 
Paper 05-05, July 2005) (arguing that it is rational for the FHLBanks to ignore failure risk 
when pricing advances because of the statutory lien protection). 
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References to the FHLBanks’ statutory lien as a contributor to the 
growth in money market intermediation, or the lack of losses on loans to 
members, known as advances, vastly overstates its importance.  The role 
of post-financial crisis regulation of bank liquidity and money market 
funds, the FHLBanks’ cooperative structure and system of comprehen-
sive safety and soundness regulation, amendments to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (“UCC”) that provided new methods of establishing prior-
ity in the event of debtor insolvency, and FHLBank secured lending 
practices with real estate collateral are far more important than the CEBA 
lien in explaining the expansion.  The CEBA lien was enacted because of 
unique circumstances during the thrift crisis of the 1980s and the ambi-
guity in perfecting security interests with multiple creditors without pos-
session.  In this article we explain that the secured lending practices of 
the FHLBanks and the revisions of the UCC in 2001 result in the CEBA 
lien having value only in a few narrow instances where the borrower de-
faults.  As such, it cannot be considered a meaningful catalyst in recent 
growth in money market intermediation. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CEBA LIEN 
Section 10 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act was amended by 
CEBA in 1987 to improve the standing of the FHLBanks as secured cred-
itors by giving them priority in receivership over other parties and lien 
creditors such as the FDIC acting as receiver or conservator.  The law 
establishing the CEBA lien reads: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any security 
interest granted to a Federal Home Loan Bank by any 
member of any Federal Home Loan Bank or any affiliate 
of any such member shall be entitled to priority over the 
claims and rights of any party (including any receiver, 
conservator, trustee, or similar party having rights of a 
lien creditor) other than claims and rights that: (1) would 
be entitled to priority under otherwise applicable law; and 
(2) are held by actual bona fide purchasers for value or by 
actual secured parties that are secured by actual perfected 
security interests.10 
 
 10. Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 10(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1430(e) (2012) (emphasis and 
punctuation added). 
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This provision was included in the legislation because, at the time, the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) was experi-
encing significant financial difficulties as a result of savings and loan as-
sociations failing at a record rate.11  FSLIC struggled to conserve cash 
resources and offered FSLIC guarantees to the FHLBanks as collateral in 
place of, or in addition to, first mortgages or mortgage-backed securities 
provided as collateral by savings and loans in return for advances from 
FHLBanks.  The CEBA lien was intended to provide comfort to the FHL-
Banks and encourage them to continue lending to insolvent thrifts at that 
time. 
To understand how the CEBA lien would encourage lending to 
insolvent thrifts, a quick review of the FHLBank lending process is nec-
essary.  Upon joining a Federal Home Loan Bank, a member must sign 
an “advances and security agreement” that establishes a security interest 
in the member’s assets for any asset by the FHLBank to the member.  
Each FHLBank has specific policies defining eligible collateral and its 
valuation as security for extensions of credit. All FHLBanks perfect their 
security interests in the collateral under the UCC. 
 Members may provide the mortgage loans held on their books as 
assets as collateral for the loan.  Depending upon its specific credit un-
derwriting criteria, the FHLBank may not require immediate delivery of 
the notes representing the mortgage loan collateral.  Alternatively, the 
FHLBank may require segregation of mortgage loan collateral at the 
member’s site, which assists the FHLBanks in monitoring the location of 
the pledged notes and ensuring that the collateral is not delivered to an-
other party.  The FHLBank may also require additional data and reporting 
on the loan collateral.  Table 1 reproduces a table from the 2017 Com-
bined Financial Report that shows the range of collateral lending values 
by pledging method.12  However, at any time an FHLBank may, in its 
judgment, require the member to physically deliver mortgage loan collat-
eral, including the pledged notes, so that possession is established—a crit-
ical issue in determining the priority of claims in a receivership. 
 
 11. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION—CURRENT FINANCIAL CONDITION AND OUTLOOK (1988), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/102136.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
 12. 2017 Combined Fin. Report, Office of Fin. of the Fed. Home Loan Banks 1, 95 (Mar. 
23, 2018), http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/resources/2017Q4CFR.pdf. 
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At the time of the adoption of the CEBA lien, the only method to 
perfect a security interest in instruments (e.g., mortgage notes) under the 
UCC was through possession;13 no provision existed in the UCC to es-
tablish a perfected security interest in instruments by filing a financing 
statement.  If multiple creditors had a security interest in the same mort-
gage notes and none of these creditors had taken possession of the notes, 
the priority of the claims was determined by the order in which the secu-
rity interest was attached.14 
The CEBA lien gave the FHLBanks’ security interest—even 
without possession of the notes—priority over an unperfected security 
interest of other creditors only if no other secured creditor had possession 
of collateral.  However, if another secured creditor with a valid security 
interest had possession, the CEBA lien would have been of no value be-
cause the UCC established perfection, and thus priority, of a perfected 
security interest, through possession of collateral.  Where the CEBA lien 
did have value was in the context of a member insolvency and subsequent 
receivership, in which the FHLBanks would have been unperfected under 
the prior version of the UCC.  The legislative intent behind the CEBA 
lien presumably was motivated to avoid this result, and to encourage the 
FHLBanks to continue lending to their members during difficult circum-
stances so that adequate liquidity was maintained in the home financing 
market.  
III. THE CEBA LIEN TODAY 
The revision of the UCC in July 2001 created the ability to perfect 
a security interest in instruments by filing a financing statement in addi-
tion to perfecting15 by obtaining possession of the collateral.16  If there 
are multiple creditors that file financing statements against the same col-
lateral and no creditor has possession, the UCC now provides for a “first 
 
 13. See U.C.C. § 9-312(a) cmt. n.2 (noting that the change in the most recent version of 
the UCC to permit perfection by filing a financing statement “is likely to be particularly useful 
in transactions involving a large number of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but continues 
to collect from the makers,” which is exactly the situation between the FHLBanks and their 
members). 
 14. See U.C.C. §§ 9-322(a)(3), 9-203(b) (stating that attachment occurs when a security 
agreement is authenticated, the FHLBank has given value, and the member has rights in the 
collateral).  There was potential for confusion because security agreements are usually dated 
but typically do not include the exact time of execution since they are not filed with a public 
body, but are bilateral documents between lenders and borrowers. like financing statements. 
 15. U.C.C. § 9-312(a).  
 16. U.C.C. § 9-313(a). 
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to file” priority17 in the event of bankruptcy or receivership.  In the event 
no secured creditor has possession of the collateral, and the FHLBank has 
not filed its financing statement first, the CEBA lien, as provided since 
its enactment, would not grant the FHLBank priority over the earlier “ac-
tual security interest” perfected under the UCC.18  The CEBA lien now 
just fills in the gap for a situation where: (1) no secured creditor, including 
the FHLBank, has possession of collateral; and (2) no other secured cred-
itor, including the FHLBank, has filed a valid financing statement at the 
time of the receivership.19  In this limited case, the FHLBanks have pri-
ority over other secured creditors, as well as receivers, conservators, or 
other lien creditors, which, given the credit policies and practices of the 
FHLBanks in addition to their highly regulated nature, is likely to be a 
rare event. 
The FHLBanks could be satisfied with the security interest estab-
lished by the advances agreement, and not be concerned at all with credit 
underwriting in only one case: if they had the perfect foresight that no 
other secured creditor would have a valid perfected security interest in a 
member’s assets in the event of a receivership.  Without this perfect fore-
sight, the FHLBanks have credit risk even with the CEBA lien in place.  
If the FHLBanks have not taken delivery of collateral and some other 
secured creditor has possession, or if the FHLBanks have not filed an 
earlier financing statement, the CEBA lien does not put them ahead of 
other perfected secured creditors.  The CEBA lien thus offers very limited 
additional protection for the FHLBanks beyond that provided for all se-
cured creditors under the UCC since 2001. 
Consequently, the absence of credit losses on advances by FHL-
Banks is more likely the result of incentives for the FHLBanks to engage 
in prudent underwriting to identify credit difficulties and potential situa-
tions where delivery of mortgage notes must be accelerated to protect 
their rights as secured lenders under the UCC.20  This prudent 
 
 17. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1). 
 18. The statute differentiates between actual secured parties and lien creditors, such as 
receivers, conservators and trustees.  Actual secured parties would be those parties that have 
lent money or given value to the debtor/borrower.  
 19. See U.C.C. § 9-501(a) (amended 2010) (requiring that U.C.C financing statements 
must be filed in the appropriate office in a specific state, must be correctly completed, and 
renewed on a periodic basis to be valid.). 
 20. An example of a legal structure in which the FHLBanks clearly must engage in pru-
dent underwriting is lending to insurance companies where the CEBA lien may not apply due 
to the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the concept of reverse preemption of Federal law with 
respect to the regulation of the business of insurance. A number of states, including North 
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underwriting includes extensive and regularly updated credit underwrit-
ing, regular collateral analysis and pricing, and periodic collateral verifi-
cation reviews, including on-site visits.21  This is not to say that the CEBA 
lien has no value to the FHLBanks.  Rather, we are suggesting that an 
FHLBank board of directors would not be meeting its duty of care—spe-
cifically sound and informed judgment—if it permitted FHLBank man-
agement to rely solely on the CEBA lien to enforce its rights as a secured 
creditor.  The CEBA lien—like all secured lending—may be thought to 
increase the cost of resolution for member banks in receivership, yet cov-
ered bonds or any other non-deposit secured borrowings pose a similar 
problem as a result of the protections afforded to all valid perfected secu-
rity interests under U.S. law.  On the other hand, secured lending is gen-
erally less expensive to the borrowing financial institution, and thus fa-
cilitates the flow of credit to consumers, businesses, and homeowners. 
The recent development of covered bonds provides an illustration 
of how the priority of secured creditor rights under the UCC is more than 
just of theoretical interest to the FHLBanks.22  Covered bonds provide 
investors a secured claim against specified assets pledged by the borrower 
similar to the secured lien held by the FHLBanks.  In this context, if an 
FHLBank were to lend to the same institution that issued the covered 
bonds, lending limits would need to be adjusted by the FHLBanks to en-
sure sufficient collateral is in place to preserve claims against the assets 
of the borrower in the event of the borrower’s receivership.  Should a 
covered bond issuer be placed in receivership, there can clearly be more 
than one party with a security interest in the failed bank’s collateral, in-
cluding an FHLBank.  The CEBA lien would not resolve this conflict in 
 
Carolina, have adopted provisions protecting FHLBank liens from the avoidance powers of 
the receiver for an insurance company.  NC Gen. Stat. § 58-30-147 (2016). The FHLBanks 
as cooperative government sponsored enterprises also have a general duty to protect the in-
vestment of their members through prudent underwriting. 
 21. OFFICE OF FIN. FED. HOME LOAN BANKS, FED. HOME LOAN BANKS COMBINED FIN. 
REPORT (2017), http://www.fhlb-of.com/specialinterest/financialframe2.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2019) (describing the underwriting processes used by the Federal Home Loan Banks). 
 22. CBs are popular in Europe and the Commonwealth countries but have not yet gained 
much traction in the United States.  In Canada the pool of bonds is ring-fenced and considered 
bankruptcy remote. Covered bonds have thrived in markets with specific legislation that ad-
dresses the complex legal structure of a covered bond claim.  See Covered Bonds as a Source 
of Funding for Bank’s Mortgage Portfolios, Royal Bank of Canada, Financial System Review 
40 (June 2018), https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/fsr-june18-ah-
nert.pdf.  Whether or not the U.S. Congress takes on the task of implementing the necessary 
legislative changes to encourage this market as part of GSE reform remains a matter of spec-
ulation.  See Covered Bonds in the United States – Latest News, US Covered Bonds, www.us-
covered-bonds.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
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favor of the FHLBank if the holder of the covered bond filed a prior, valid 
UCC financing statement, or had obtained possession of the collateral. 
IV. THE CEBA LIEN AND TAXPAYER RISK 
The FDIC and other statutory lien creditors, such as state insur-
ance receivers and bankruptcy trustees, may have continuing concerns 
about the CEBA lien’s potential to increase their exposure in the event of 
a member’s receivership.23  As such, it is worth contrasting FHLBank 
advances with the treatment of a repurchase agreement (another instance 
of secured borrowing) in the event of receivership.  The repurchase agree-
ment is treated essentially like a secured financing by the FDIC, and the 
value of the claim of the buyer/secured party will be based on the differ-
ence between the collateral value and the amount borrowed.24  If the col-
lateral value exceeds the loan value, the FDIC would give value to the 
full amount borrowed and repay the borrowing from the sales proceeds 
of the collateral, or repay the buyer/secured party for returning the as-
sets.25  And if the collateral value is less than the amount borrowed, the 
FDIC would only repay the value of the collateral, leaving the buyer/se-
cured party with a general unsecured claim for this deficiency.26  The only 
difference between the repo and advances treatment in receivership is the 
situation where the collateral value is less than the amount borrowed.  In 
this case, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDI Act”) provides that 
the rights of the receiver to disallow or determine a claim to be under-
secured does not apply to extensions of credit by an FHLBank, or a Fed-
eral Reserve bank, or security interests granted as a result of these exten-
sions of credit.27  FDIC regulations issued pursuant to the FDI Act further 
provide that if the receiver is in possession of any collateral pledged to an 
FHLBank, the receiver shall, upon request of the Bank, promptly deliver 
the collateral to the Bank or its designee.28 
 
 23. See e.g., D. Stojanovic, et al., Is Federal Home Loan Bank Funding Risky Business 
for the FDIC?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIST (Oct. 2000); see generally 
D. Stojanovic et al., Do Federal Home Loan Bank Membership and Advances Increase Bank 
Risk-Taking?, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 680 (May 2008); see also R. Bennet et al., Should the 
FDIC Worry About the FHLB? (Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 2005-10, 
July 2005). 
 24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(e)(8)(D)(i), 1821(e)(8)(D)(v), 1821(e)(8)(E)(ii) (2012).  
 25. § 1821(d)(5)(D)(ii) (2018). 
 26. Id. 
 27. § 1821(d)(5)(D)(iii) (2018). 
 28. 12 C.F.R. § 360.2(b) (2018).  
2019] “SUPER LIEN” DOESN’T MEAN SUPER RISK 19 
The FHLBanks indeed have better protection than an unsecured 
and other secured creditors in many circumstances—assuming no other 
valid secured creditor had possession of the collateral or filed a valid, 
prior financing statement.  In practice, a financially weak counterparty is 
unlikely to obtain repo funding, but in the event it could, the collateral 
haircuts would be larger than a more creditworthy borrower and the term 
of the credit much shorter.  Similarly for the FHLBanks, weaker financial 
members would be subject to larger haircuts and term restrictions as well 
in order to provide additional protection to the FHLBank.29  These pro-
tections also support the public liquidity mission of the FHLBanks to be 
consistent providers of liquidity to the financial system, consistent with 
safe and sound operations.30  
Another difference between the repo and advances treatment in 
receivership is the issue of prepayment fees.  Federal regulations and the 
FHLBanks’ advances and security agreements stipulate that prepayment 
fees are required for early retirement of advances (unless callable) under 
most circumstances.31  These fees are asymmetric and make the FHL-
Banks economically neutral when current advances rates have fallen rel-
ative to the rate on the current, higher rate advance outstanding.  Under 
FDIC regulations, this fee would have to be paid by the FDIC as part of 
the repayment of the advance to obtain clear title to the collateral securing 
the advance.32  This cost to the FDIC may not be required for a repo of a 
similar maturity, but it is not related to the CEBA lien. 
V. THE CEBA LIEN AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
The primary question the literature addresses around the CEBA 
lien is whether it contributes to excessive risk exposure either through 
individual large bank lending or collective lending across all members.  
The literature makes a number of references to the CEBA lien, fre-
quently referred to as the “super” lien, as an explanation for the 
 
 29. OFFICE OF FIN. FED. HOME LOAN BANKS, supra note 21. 
 30. 12 U.S.C. § 4513(f) (2012); 12 C.F.R. §1265.2 (2018). 
 31. Exceptions exist where an advance contains a prepayment option, is for a maturity or 
pricing term of six months or less, or is otherwise designed to make the FHLBank financially 
indifferent to the early repayment.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1266.6(b) (2018) (requiring an FHLBank 
must charge a prepayment fee which makes the FHLBank financially indifferent to repay-
ment).  
 32. See 12 C.F.R. § 360.2(e) (2018) (allowing a claim for an FHLBank’s prepayment fee 
if it is pursuant to a written contract, the amount of the prepayment fee does not exceed the 
present value of the FHLBank’s loss, and the prepayment fee is fully secured). 
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FHLBanks avoidance of any credit losses associated with advances.  It 
is argued that the super lien creates disincentives for underwriting and 
pricing risk, which permits a member bank to grow by substituting 
advances for insured deposits.  Thus, borrowing members can 
grow without any market discipline thus increasing the risk to 
the FDIC.33  For the reasons stated above, the relatively narrow scope 
of additional protection afforded by the CEBA lien is not sufficient to 
incentivize the FHLBanks to make imprudent or excessive loans to a sin-
gle borrower. 
A recent set of articles by Gissler and Narabajad addressed po-
tential systemic risk created by the FHLBanks as a consequence of SEC-
mandated money market reform and new liquidity ratios mandated by the 
banking regulators consistent with the Basel III accords.34  The argument 
is that the FHLBanks have become the new intermediary between com-
mercial banks and money market funds.  Instead of commercial banks (or 
bank holding companies) issuing certificates of deposit or commercial 
paper directly to prime money market funds, which due to negative reg-
ulatory treatment have shrunk in size, the (perhaps unintended) conse-
quence of SEC and Basel III changes resulted in increased demand by 
government funds for eligible securities issued by the U.S. government 
and affiliated entities.  Aside from Treasury discount notes, securities is-
sued by Government Sponsored Enterprises were the next largest source 
for fund assets.35 
Among the GSEs, the FHLBank System had been the largest is-
suer of discount notes and were the likely source of new paper that were 
 
 33. See D. Stojanovic et al., Do Federal Home Loan Bank Membership and Advances 
Increase Risk Taking, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 680, 684 (2008). 
 34. On July 23, 2014, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission adopted 
structural and operational reforms to address risks of investor runs on money market funds. 
These reforms included requiring a floating net asset value (NAV), liquidity fees and redemp-
tion gates for institutional prime money market funds, and were phased in over a two-year 
period beginning in 2014. Funds investing 99.5 percent or more of their assets in cash and 
government securities, including those issued by the FHLBanks, are exempt from these rules. 
FEDS NOTES, supra note 1; see also Press Release, Sec. and Exchange Comm’n, SEC Adopts 
Money Market Fund Reform Rules (July 23, 2014), www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-
143. 
 35. The Investment Company Institute (ICI) reports that as of September 30, 2018, 
Agency securities comprised $610 billion and repurchase agreements backed by Agency se-
curities comprised $323 billion out of $2,187 billion in total government money market fund 
assets.  Total U.S. government security holdings were $735 billion of Treasury debt and $515 
billion of repurchase agreements secured by Treasury debt.  See Investment Company Insti-
tute, MONEY MARKET FUND PORTFOLIO, https://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmfsummary 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
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qualified investments for these funds.36  However, the FHLBanks would 
only be issuing new discount notes to support demand for advances.  
Based on the construction of the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable 
funding ratios, the globally systemically important bank (G-SIB) mem-
bers began borrowing from the FHLBanks to meet the minimum require-
ments for both ratios.37  Consequently, the shift of approximately $400 
billion from prime funds to government funds reflected the desire by in-
vestors to avoid the new risks associated with prime funds and a G-SIB 
strategy to shift borrowing to the FHLBanks to efficiently address the 
new liquidity requirements and to make up for the loss of funding from 
the prime funds.  
The systemic risk arises from two sources: the concentration of 
lending to G-SIBs as a result of this new intermediation in the money 
markets and the potential inability of the FHLBanks to rollover the debt 
issued to support the G-SIB borrowing.38  An argument is made that the 
CEBA lien has led to more growth than would otherwise occur and in-
creases systemic risk because it “bails out” poor underwriting, leading to 
lack of concern about the borrower’s ability to repay.39  A G-SIB in dis-
tress may have a material financial impact on the FHLBanks because of 
the G-SIB’s multiple memberships.  If the FHLBanks are perceived to 
have financial difficulties, it could spill over into the money markets, es-
pecially if investors are worried about the implicit government backstop.  
Additionally, this loss of investor confidence could destabilize the FHL-
Bank System causing it to lose access to money markets or find its access 
impaired.40  In this situation, the System would be forced to use contin-
gent liquidity or not rollover advances to G-SIBs, creating further stress 
on money markets as they seek other sources of short-term funding.  A 
related aspect to this scenario, but independent of G-SIB distress, is that 
 
 36. Discount notes are securities issued with a maturity of 365/366 days or less that are 
generally sold at issuance for less than their stated principal amount at maturity, but may be 
sold at par or at a premium, and are paid only on their maturity dates at 100% of their principal 
amounts. FHLBANKS, Supplement to Information Memorandum 1, 8 (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/pageBuilder/information-memorandum-112. 
 37. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and the FDIC adopted a final rule in September 2014 that implemented en-
hanced quantitative liquidity requirements consistent with the standards established by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Li-
quidity Risk Monitoring Tools, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm. 
 38. FEDS NOTES, supra note 1; see also Anadu & Baklanova, supra note 2. 
 39. FEDS NOTES, supra note 1. 
 40. Id. 
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some exogenous shock impairs the ability of the FHLBanks to rollover 
their short-term debt, causing a liquidity crisis to spread through the 
money markets as the FHLBanks either adjust their investment portfolio 
or do not roll over advances causing their member banks to search else-
where for funding. 
While the worst case scenarios outlined above are possible, nei-
ther is very probable.41  It is true that FHLBank advances have grown 
significantly in recent years, from approximately $500 billion at the end 
of 2013, to over $700 billion at the end of 2017.  It is also true that the 
FHLBank consolidated debt is now a favorite of money market investors.  
However, neither of these trends is attributable to the CEBA lien.42  This 
increase in the size of the FHLBanks’ combined balance sheet is due to a 
number of factors, including an improving economy, a stabilizing finan-
cial sector, and post-financial crisis legislation and regulation encourag-
ing member banks to hold more liquidity.  This increase in investor de-
mand has not been driven by a desire to exploit loopholes in the law that 
allow FHLBanks to lend to their members imprudently and excessively.  
The narrow constraints of the CEBA lien provide no protection to an 
FHLBank making an imprudent advance.  Moreover, lending to large in-
stitutions is closely monitored and the scenarios described above assume 
a static management response, which would not be the case.  All lenders, 
including the FHLBanks, would monitor potentially troubled credits and 
certainly reduce the maturities as risk indicators signaled future problems.  
As such, concerns about rollover risk based on the maturity intermedia-
tion today is not necessarily what a balance sheet would look like moving 
into a crisis. 
The FHLBanks do benefit from a number of structural and legal 
advantages that support their ability to act as reliable providers of liquid-
ity during crises, as they did during the lead-up to the 2008 financial cri-
sis.43  The FHLBanks operate as cooperatives which require capital con-
tributions from their members in order to borrow and participate in their 
 
 41. Anadu & Baklanova, supra note 2. 
 42. OFFICE OF FIN. OF THE FED. HOME LOAN BANKS, 2017 COMBINED FINANCIAL REPORT, 
1, 95 (Mar. 23, 2018), http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/resources/2017Q4CFR.pdf. 
 43. Adam B. Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-
to-Last Resort?, FED. HOME LOAN BANK OF NEW YORK, No. 357 (Nov. 2008), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr357.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2019). 
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services.44 All advances from an FHLBank must be secured.45  The Sec-
retary of the Treasury is authorized to purchase obligations of the FHL-
Banks up to $4 billion.46  This authority was made unlimited during the 
recent financial crisis as a sign of support for the FHLBanks and as a 
market stability mechanism, but that authority was not utilized.47  All of 
these factors along with the FHLBanks’ history of prudent underwrit-
ing—much more than the CEBA lien—have encouraged investors to pur-
chase FHLBank debt in large volumes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The FHLBanks occupy an increasingly significant role in the na-
tion’s financial system.  This role has been enhanced as the result of reg-
ulatory changes after the 2008 financial crisis such as increased liquidity 
requirements and money market fund reforms.  As a result, commentators 
have raised concerns over the incentives, such as the CEBA lien, that may 
exist for the FHLBanks to lend excessively, which could negatively im-
pact financial markets due to the important role of the FHLBanks in fund-
ing markets.  These concerns seem misplaced due to the limited nature of 
the CEBA lien.  After changes in the UCC in the early 2000s, the CEBA 
lien has limited applicability and offers little additional protection to the 
FHLBanks beyond that available to any secured lender. 
The FHLBanks are strictly regulated for safety and soundness by 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), and are required to con-
duct their secured lending in conformity with the UCC.48  They are regu-
larly examined on their credit and collateral practices.  In addition, the 
CEBA lien may reduce systemic risk in that it, and accompanying regu-
lations from the FDIC and other regulators, may signal public support for 
the FHLBanks’ mission in a way that assures markets of the unique role 
of the FHLBanks in the financial system, thus reducing the risk of a freeze 
in liquidity to the FHLBanks and assuring an adequate flow of credit to 
member financial institutions.  The recent financial crisis supports this 
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https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/AdvisoryBulletins/Pages/AB-2013-10-
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analysis in that the FHLBanks remained a consistent source of liquidity 
for the financial system, particularly during the early stages of the crisis.49  
Many states have recently enacted provisions similar to the CEBA lien in 
their state insurance codes so that their insurance companies will have 
reliable access to FHLBank liquidity.50  Far more important to the safety 
and soundness of the FHLBanks, and by extension, the larger financial 
system, than the CEBA lien, is strong prudential management and super-
vision of the FHLBanks, including credit and collateral risk management, 
liquidity, and capital requirements.  The FHLBanks benefit from strong 
oversight by the FHFA in these areas, which has been enhanced in recent 
years.  The FHLBanks also benefit from a legal and regulatory structure 
that supports their resiliency during times of stress, including access to 
public support and an established source of capital support through their 
member institutions.  These are the tools that should be relied upon to 
reduce systemic risk, not the removal of the CEBA lien.  
  
 
 49. 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(1) (2012). 
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